

UTILIZATION CRITERIA FOR \_\_\_\_\_ PHOTOGRAPHY

1. The basic principle to be adhered to in the utilization of \_\_\_\_\_ materials is:
    - a. The process for extracting information from the original materials for use outside the CONTROL SYSTEM must be done in such a way as to leave no evidence or indication of its origin.
  2. Exploitation of \_\_\_\_\_ photography will be accomplished within the CONTROL SYSTEM to the maximum degree possible at the \_\_\_\_\_ level. Exploitation within the system below this level will generally be restricted to the Major Component Command level.
  3. Procedures for utilizing and exploiting \_\_\_\_\_ photography will be restricted to one of the following:
    - a. Information may be studied within the \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM by cleared key intelligence analysts, operations and planning personnel and used as background without reference to source in situations where documentation is not required.
    - b. Through a final review within the \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM, of certain finished intelligence materials such as Order of Battle documents and estimates, by a panel of cleared intelligence analysts, within each Department or Agency, having available to them information from all sources, revisions and corrections may be made in order to reflect, in documents which are disseminated outside the system, information derived from \_\_\_\_\_ photography.
    - c. Through a process within the \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM extractions from the original photography may be used in the annotation of existing photography and in the preparation of graphics, predictions and simulations which are disseminated outside the system.
    - d. Written reports and graphic descriptions based on information derived from \_\_\_\_\_ photography may be prepared as Intelligence Reports by cleared analysts working within the \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM and may be released outside the system provided (1) the description can be attributed to a cover source or (2) inference of a cover source is introduced and collateral information to support the information can be produced.
- The principle established in paragraph 1a will be rigidly followed in exploitation undertaken as provided in b, c, and d, this paragraph.
- Further, it is intended that the maximum utilization of \_\_\_\_\_ materials be made under the provisions of paragraph a and c above; and that utilization of the provisions of paragraph b and d be held to the absolute minimum.
4. Initially each intelligence producer will submit cases which it develops under paragraph 3 above to the Utilization Board for clearance.

UTILIZATION CRITERIA FOR ELINT

1. The basic principles to be adhered to in the utilization of \_\_\_\_\_ ELINT materials are:

a. The materials which reveal the fact that information was obtained from overflight will never be disseminated or utilized outside the CONTROL SYSTEM. These materials include tapes and raw data that can be identified with the \_\_\_\_\_ system.

b. The process for extracting information from the raw data, cited above, for use outside the CONTROL SYSTEM must be done in such a way as to leave no evidence or indication of its origin as being \_\_\_\_\_.

2. Exploitation of \_\_\_\_\_ ELINT will be accomplished with the CONTROL SYSTEM to the maximum degree possible at the \_\_\_\_\_ level. Exploitation within the system below this level will generally be restricted to the Major Component Command level.

3. Procedures for utilizing and exploiting \_\_\_\_\_ ELINT will be restricted to the following:

a. Information may be studied within the \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM by cleared key intelligence analysts, operations and planning personnel, and used as background without reference to source in situations where documentation is not required.

b. Raw ELINT data originally recorded on \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM tapes may be analysed outside the CONTROL SYSTEM only when all aspects have been removed that could identify the source as \_\_\_\_\_. After all original or raw reproductions of tapes have been played back by cleared analysts, for purposes of insuring that no recorded information is present which will compromise source or any operational information, they may be passed to uncleared analysts for analysis purposes who have a minimum SECRET clearance. In case source or operational data is contained on the original tapes, cleared analysts may make a reproduction of the tapes deleting this information to insure that only pure ELINT intercept which does not reveal operational information is present. Following this process, the reproduced tapes may then be passed to uncleared analysts as stated above.

c. Through the deletion of those operational aspects requiring \_\_\_\_\_ control, see paragraph 1a above, the \_\_\_\_\_ ELINT may be disseminated outside the system, but may not be classified lower than SECRET. Those operational aspects requiring deletion are: pre-mission planning and briefing, post-mission interrogation, navigational data, relative electronics intercept bearing information, and any other information that could compromise the source. In accordance with the foregoing, only the data which follows, by security classification, will be released outside the \_\_\_\_\_ system:

SECRET AND TOP SECRET REPORTS

1. Location - Provided a collateral source could feasibly obtain or support the location.
2. Type - function.
3. Signal characteristics.
4. Year of information.
5. Source of information will not be indicated, in any form, in the SECRET and TOP SECRET reports.
6. When the above has been accomplished, this type report need not be marked NOFORN.

TOP SECRET CODEWORD REPORTS

1. All the information contained in SECRET/TOP SECRET reports as indicated in paragraph 3c, above.
2. The source of information may be indicated ONLY AS COLLATERAL OR FROM OTHER RELIABLE SOURCES.
- d. The principle established in paragraph 1b above will be rigidly followed in sub-paragraphs 3b and c, above.
4. Each Department or Agency will submit to the Utilization Board for approval its proposed procedures developed under the provisions of paragraphs 3b and c of this paper.

UTILIZATION CRITERIA FOR COMINT MATERIAL

1. COMINT raw materials are derived from two sources. First, there is the material associated with operations which is gathered in the normal functioning of the COMINT intercept effort; secondly, there is the special material gathered by airborne electronic equipment.

2. a. That portion of the first source material which deals with the technical aspects of COMINT operations can be extracted and disseminated through technical channels without reference to source. Therefore, it is not considered to be a problem. The intelligence content of the material from the first source will be used only in the system.

b. Materials gathered by airborne electronic equipment will be so unique that the revelation of their existence to non-cleared personnel will be impossible.

3. Intelligence studies prepared by the and the military services and area studies usually prepared by the may utilize material as background when it has the effect of upgrading the validity of other sources data contained in the studies. material must not appear as unique or identifiable data.

4. Deviations from the principles stated above will be referred to the Utilization Board for special consideration prior to taking action.